


## Introduction

The Natural Resource Charter Benchmarking Framework is a tool for benchmarking a country's management of oil, gas and minerals against global best practices. The framework draws on the policy options and practical advice of the Natural Resource Charter, and consists of a series of questions that government officials, concerned citizens or actors in the international community can use to structure research, discussions and strategic planning.

Created in response to government and civil society demand for a practical way to measure resource governance, the framework is the product of five years of expert input and testing in more than 15 country projects. Oxford Policy Management and Natural Resource Charter researchers developed the first version of the framework in 2011. Since then it has been used by the governments of Tanzania and Sierra Leone, coalitions of non-governmental actors in Nigeria and Myanmar, political parties in Ghana, and NRGi in 11 countries. (See figure 1 for an overview of the framework's uses to date.)

Each use has provided valuable learning opportunities, allowing NRGi to further improve the questions and guidance, and to build linkages with other important resource governance tools. The framework references questions and data from the Resource Governance Index, as well as the requirements of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Standard. Other tools that have informed the development of the framework include the World Bank Mining Investment and Governance Review, the World Bank Governance Indicators, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Tool, the ICMM Mining Partnerships for Development Toolkit, the Publish What You Pay Extracting Equality Guide, the African Peer Review Mechanism and the African Mineral Development Center Country Mining Vision Guidebook.

### OVERVIEW OF FRAMEWORK USES TO DATE



## Objectives

The framework has been designed for a diverse set of uses, ranging from basic desk research, to training curricula, complex projects involving the production of primary research, cross-stakeholder dialogue, and evaluations of government strategy and its implementation. Three key objectives have shaped its development.

- 1 *Assess priorities.* Designed to cover as many of the key issues involved in resource management as possible and assess the relative urgency of various challenges, the framework helps users see the big picture in resource governance, weigh competing concerns and determine where to concentrate scarce resources.
- 2 *Build consensus and bridge divides.* The framework helps diverse users come to a shared understanding on resource management, and does so by addressing varied policy areas that are typically dominated by distinct organizations, stakeholder groups and professional backgrounds.
- 3 *Monitor progress.* Providing a standard set of structured questions, the framework can be used to track changes in the management of natural resources over time through regular re-scoring exercises.

## Structure

The basic building blocks of the framework are the 12 precepts of the Natural Resource Charter. Each precept addresses a specific area of policy and practice, and each has its own guidance note (with the exception of precepts 7 and 8, which in the framework are combined given their interconnected content).


The precepts are in three groups:

- Domestic foundations for resource governance (precepts 1 and 2), which considers the overarching domestic legal-institutional framework and accountability environment.
- The decision chain (precepts 3 to 10), covering a range of domestic policy issues ranging from discovery, to getting a good deal, to revenue management and investing for development.
- International foundations for resource governance (precepts 11 and 12), considering the important influence of extractive companies and the international community.

While precepts 1 through 10 predominantly contain questions that examine government activities, precepts 11 and 12 concern the activities of extractive companies and the international community.

Under each precept there are two levels of questions. Primary questions break the precept area into two-to-four key issues. They are aimed to be comprehensible for users with varying levels of technical expertise. Beneath each primary question are a set of secondary questions that drill down into more specific issues. They can be used as guidance for answering the primary questions, or each answered individually in more rigorous or extensive use cases. As an additional aid, most precepts also feature a transparency table that lists the specific disclosures needed to help build effective accountability in the decision area. (There are no transparency tables for precepts 9 and 10, which look beyond the resource sector. Precepts 11 and 12 share the same transparency table.)

# Precepts of the Natural Resource Charter



## Using the framework: five steps to planning

- 1 *Determine whether the framework is the right tool.* Before starting any analysis using the framework, users should ask whether it is the correct tool. The framework is useful for carrying out nuanced or detailed research on the role of governments in natural resource management. While it contains guidance for thinking about the role of companies, the international community and civil society, these are not its primary focus. Further, because the questions ask for significant amounts of country-specific content, the framework does not provide a straightforward basis for cross-country comparison.
- 2 *Define scope.* The framework can be employed in full or in part. Full applications covering all 12 precepts allow for consideration of a wide range of issues, which is especially useful for institutions with broad mandates, or for consensus-building activities among a wide range of actors. Narrower applications can be less demanding—focusing on single precepts or set of precepts—and are useful for organizations with more focused responsibilities.
- 3 *Decide depth.* The hierarchical nature of the questions means that the framework can be used at different levels of depth. Those who wish to produce lighter analyses can address high-level primary questions, while those working on more in-depth analyses can drill down using secondary questions. Primary questions, being broad in scope, can structure research or dialogue for high-level actors or less technical users, while secondary questions can inform research or dialogue with specialist users.
- 4 *Set answer format.* While there is no fixed way to present answers, framework questions have been designed so that “yes” responses mean that best practice is being followed, and “no” responses mean that best practice is not being followed. Users can therefore simply answer questions with a “yes,” “no,” or “partially yes / partially no” response, using long-form text to justify the answer, and using a three-color traffic light marker to make the score more visible. Some users have also assigned a prioritization score to their answers, again justifying this with long-form text. This method works well when the framework is being used for an agenda-setting purpose.
- 5 *Validate results.* Users should identify a plan for how they will validate their findings to ensure that they are well-founded. Validation processes should examine whether results reflect the country context, and are grounded in a solid understanding of the issues. Results will be more credible if they are endorsed and supported by validators who are seen locally as influential, relatively neutral and legitimate. In many processes an expert panel of specialists, reflecting as much as possible the full range of expertise relevant to the Charter, has been used to validate the findings. The use of expert peer reviewers is another route.

## Getting help

NRGI staff are available to answer questions and provide guidance to those wanting to use the framework. Uses of the framework are diverse, and NRG staff encourage and support others to adapt the framework in new ways to help improve resource governance. Email [nrc-support@resourcegovernance.org](mailto:nrc-support@resourcegovernance.org) for more information.

## Overview of benchmarking framework

(For guidance in answering questions, please see specific precept guidance notes.)

	Primary questions	Secondary questions
Strategy, legal framework and institutions (precept 1)	<b>1.1 Fundamentals of the resource endowment.</b> Has the government clearly identified the country's resource endowment, who owns it, and the positive and negative impacts of extraction?	<b>1.1.1 Ownership.</b> Has the government clearly established who owns extractive resources?
		<b>1.1.2 Resource endowments.</b> Does the government have a well-informed understanding of the country's resource endowment?
		<b>1.1.3 Resource dependency.</b> Does the government have a realistic and sound understanding of how dependent the country is on natural resources?
		<b>1.1.4 Impacts of extraction.</b> Has the government seriously considered the positive and negative impacts of exploitation in making the decision whether or not to extract?
	<b>1.2 Resource strategy.</b> Does the government have an inclusive and comprehensive national strategy for the management of resources?	<b>1.2.1 Cognizant of reality.</b> Does the resource strategy reflect an understanding of the fundamentals of resource wealth?
		<b>1.2.2 Considering the long term.</b> Does the resource strategy take a long-term approach?
		<b>1.2.3 Comprehensiveness.</b> Does the resource strategy reflect consideration of the full range of issues in management of resource wealth?
		<b>1.2.4 Inclusiveness.</b> Does the government engage all relevant actors in the development, implementation and oversight of the resource strategy?
		<b>1.2.5 Legal framework.</b> Does the resource strategy guide the relevant legal framework?
		<b>1.2.6 Institutional framework.</b> Does the resource strategy guide the relevant institutional framework?
Transparency and accountability (precept 2)	<b>2.1 Transparency.</b> Does the government ensure that resource management is sufficiently transparent for all actors to effectively understand and scrutinize decision making and its implications?	<b>2.1.1 Access to the legal framework.</b> Does the government ensure that the full legal framework governing resource management is available to the public?
		<b>2.1.2 Disclosure rules.</b> Has the government established rules that enable access to information on resource management?
		<b>2.1.3 Information management.</b> Do government agencies have effective information management systems that support access to information?
		<b>2.1.4 Open data.</b> Does the government publish data according to open data standards?
		<b>2.1.5 Comprehensive disclosure.</b> Does the government ensure that data is released on a comprehensive set of resource governance and management issues?
	<b>2.2 Official oversight.</b> Do government oversight bodies hold officials to account?	<b>2.2.1 Legislature.</b> Does the legislature hold public officials to account on issues relating to resource governance?
		<b>2.2.2 Supreme audit institution.</b> Does a supreme audit institution oversee the government's management of financial flows relating to the extractive sector, and does the government respond to its findings?
		<b>2.2.3 Corruption control.</b> Does the government take effective measures to deter, detect and prosecute corruption?
	<b>2.3 Communications and public oversight.</b> Is there a critical mass of informed citizens that holds the government to account?	<b>2.3.1 Government communication and the management of expectations.</b> Does the government implement a communications strategy to ensure that the public has realistic expectations of the future benefits and costs of extraction?
		<b>2.3.2 Civic and political freedoms.</b> Does the government ensure that civic and political freedoms are consistently upheld?
		<b>2.3.3 Media and civil society.</b> Do the media and civil society groups effectively improve public accountability in natural resource management?
		<b>2.3.4 Independent research.</b> Do research institutions carry out independent and high-quality research on resource governance?
		<b>2.3.5 Professional associations.</b> Do professional associations and unions actively promote and enforce professional standards of conduct and engagement among their members who are engaged in extractive industries?

<p><b>Exploration, licensing and monitoring operations (precept 3)</b></p>	<p><b>3.1 License planning.</b> Does the government adequately prepare before allocating licenses?</p>	<p><b>3.1.1 Pre-licensing survey.</b> Does the government facilitate or fund pre-licensing surveys and make geological information available to companies?</p>
		<p><b>3.1.2 Strategic impact assessments.</b> Does the government conduct and publish a strategic impact assessment before allocating licenses?</p>
		<p><b>3.1.3 Non-resource property rights.</b> Prior to allocating licenses, does the government clearly establish who holds property rights to the land being licensed and how those rights will be upheld?</p>
		<p><b>3.1.4 Resource rights.</b> Does the government organize licenses to ensure that license areas do not overlap or conflict with existing rights to explore and extract resources?</p>
		<p><b>3.1.5 Pace of licensing and size of licenses.</b> Does the government have an effective policy on the pace of licensing and size of license areas?</p>
	<p><b>3.2 Awarding resource licenses.</b> Does the government allocate licenses to competent and law-abiding companies, and in a way that maximizes value for the country?</p>	<p><b>3.2.1 License pre-qualification.</b> Does the government screen license applicants before allowing applicants to enter a licensing round or negotiation?</p>
		<p><b>3.2.2 License award method.</b> Does the government use a method of awarding licenses that accounts for the level of competitive interest and the administrative capacity of the government?</p>
		<p><b>3.2.3 License terms and post-bid negotiations.</b> Does the government limit the use of negotiable/biddable terms and resist further negotiations after the bidding process?</p>
		<p><b>3.2.4 License transfers.</b> Does the government submit license transfers to the same checks and balances as an initial license award?</p>
		<p><b>3.2.5 License disclosure.</b> Does the government disclose pre- and post-license round information?</p>
		<p><b>3.2.6 License oversight.</b> Is oversight of the licensing process effective, and are conflicts of interest avoided?</p>
	<p><b>3.3 Monitoring operations.</b> Does the government adequately monitor operations across project life cycles?</p>	<p><b>3.3.1 Development plans.</b> Does the government evaluate and approve development plans with appropriate consideration for all stakeholders without undue delay?</p>
		<p><b>3.3.2 Monitoring capacity.</b> Does the government have the capacity to monitor companies during each stage of the project life cycle?</p>
		<p><b>3.3.3 Data management.</b> Does the government collect and manage geological and operational data?</p>

<b>Taxation and other company payments (precept 4)</b>	<b>4.1 Setting fiscal terms.</b> Does the fiscal regime secure a reasonable return for the government while still attracting sufficient investment?	<b>4.1.1 Royalty or cost limit.</b> Does the fiscal regime include a tax on gross sales—a royalty or equivalent—to ensure the state receives some payments despite changes to profitability?
		<b>4.1.2 Variable tax on rents.</b> Does the fiscal regime include a variable rate tax (rent tax or excess profits tax) targeted explicitly at rents?
		<b>4.1.3 Corporate income tax.</b> Does the extractive sector fiscal regime include the generally applicable corporate income tax in the country?
		<b>4.1.4 Investment incentives.</b> Has the government avoided the use of costly or non-essential investment incentives?
		<b>4.1.5 State equity.</b> If the state holds equity shares in resource companies, are the expected fiscal and non-fiscal benefits of the equity greater than the costs of acquiring it?
		<b>4.1.6 Fiscal regime evaluation techniques.</b> Do government officials have the expertise and information to evaluate and design fiscal regimes?
	<b>4.2 Legal framework of fiscal terms.</b> Does the legal framework of fiscal terms provide sufficient accountability to citizens, stability for investors and flexibility to respond to changing circumstances?	<b>4.2.1 Scope of law.</b> Does the government set all fiscal terms using legislation or model contracts, with a minimum number and defined scope for bidding or negotiation terms?
		<b>4.2.2 Stability clauses.</b> If there are legal clauses that stabilize legal terms governing an extractive project, do these clauses limit stabilization to key fiscal terms, and is stabilization limited in duration?
	<b>4.3 Tax administration.</b> Do government authorities collect the full value of taxes and other payments owed to the state?	<b>4.3.1 Fiscal regime simplicity.</b> Are the definitions of tax bases similar to one another, and is there a reasonable limit on the number of tax types?
		<b>4.3.2 Anti-tax avoidance measures.</b> Does the fiscal regime include a set of provisions to limit tax avoidance practices?
		<b>4.3.3 Tax authority organization.</b> Is the number of collecting organizations minimized, and do tax administrators coordinate with other government agencies?
		<b>4.3.4 Administrative procedures.</b> Are tax administration procedures simple, effective and harmonized, reflecting principles of self-assessment, with a risk-based compliance strategy?
		<b>4.3.5 Tax administration capacity.</b> Are tax administrators competent and well-resourced?
	<b>4.4 Accountability and transparency of fiscal regimes.</b> Is the government held to account for setting and collecting taxes and other company payments?	<b>4.4.1 Tax transparency.</b> Does the government disclose fiscal terms and company data to inform oversight?
		<b>4.4.2 Public consultation on tax.</b> Does the government consult with businesses and civil society before reforming the fiscal regime?
		<b>4.4.3 Oversight of taxation.</b> Do official agencies perform strong oversight of the fiscal regime?

Local impacts (precept 5)	<p><b>5.1 Trust.</b> Does the government ensure that there are good working relationships between all stakeholders within affected communities?</p>	<p><b>5.1.1 Meaningful participation.</b> Does the government ensure that affected communities meaningfully participate in decision-making about resource projects?</p>
		<p><b>5.1.2 Managing the expectations of affected communities.</b> Does the government ensure that affected communities have realistic expectations about the impacts of resource projects?</p>
		<p><b>5.1.3 Grievance and dispute resolution procedures.</b> Does the government ensure that there are credible and effective dispute resolution procedures for affected communities?</p>
		<p><b>5.1.4 Security safeguards.</b> Does the government ensure that government and private security providers related to resource projects do not use excessive force?</p>
		<p><b>5.1.5 Indigenous peoples.</b> Does the government ensure that the rights of indigenous people are protected?</p>
	<p><b>5.2 Impact assessment.</b> Does the government maintain an effective system for assessing the potential impacts of resource projects?</p>	<p><b>5.2.1 Strategic impact assessments.</b> Does the government use strategic impact assessments before deciding to open an area to exploration and production activities?</p>
		<p><b>5.2.2 Environmental and social impact assessments.</b> Does the government use environmental and social impact assessments to inform decision-making at all stages of resource projects?</p>
	<p><b>5.3 Cost mitigation.</b> Does the government mitigate the environmental, social and health costs of resource projects?</p>	<p><b>5.3.1 Approach to cost mitigation.</b> Does the government favor prevention over minimization, and avoid practices that require compensation and resettlement?</p>
		<p><b>5.3.2 Environmental, social and health regulation.</b> Does the government set and enforce effective environmental, social and health regulations?</p>
		<p><b>5.3.3 Environmental mitigation management plans.</b> Does the government require companies to develop environmental mitigation management plans and does it ensure that these plans are followed?</p>
		<p><b>5.3.4 Disaster response plans.</b> Does the government require companies to develop effective disaster response plans?</p>
		<p><b>5.3.5 Project closure.</b> Does the government effectively allocate responsibility for the execution and financing of project closure and land rehabilitation?</p>
		<p><b>5.3.6 Compensation.</b> Where social and environmental costs are unavoidable, does the government ensure that there is adequate compensation?</p>
		<p><b>5.3.7 Resettlement.</b> Where resettlement is unavoidable, does the government ensure that resettlement provides adequate redress?</p>
<p><b>5.4 Local benefits.</b> Does the government help affected communities to benefit from resource projects?</p>	<p><b>5.4.1 Community development agreements.</b> Does the government ensure that companies come to an agreement with affected communities as to how companies will deliver community benefits?</p>	
	<p><b>5.4.2 Employment, contracting and procurement in affected communities.</b> Does the government encourage companies to direct employment and procurement opportunities toward affected communities?</p>	



State-owned enterprises (precept 6)	6.1 SOE role and funding. Does the government clearly define the SOE's role and establish a working funding mechanism for the company?	6.1.1 Commercial role. Does the government clearly define a commercial role for the SOE that reflects the company's actual financial and technical capacity?
		6.1.2 Non-commercial roles. Does the government clearly define the company's non-commercial roles? Does this definition limit conflicts of interest?
		6.1.3 Funding mechanism. Does the government ensure that the SOE has a workable funding mechanism?
	6.2 SOE corporate governance. Do the SOE's corporate governance systems limit political interference in the company's technical decisions, while ensuring effective oversight?	6.2.1 Role of state shareholders. Does the government clearly establish the identity and role of state shareholders in the SOE?
		6.2.2 Board models. Does the SOE have an empowered, professional and independent board?
		6.2.3 Staff integrity. Does the SOE invest in staff integrity and capacity?
	6.3 SOE transparency and accountability. Are SOE decision-making and operations transparent and accountable?	6.3.1 SOE operational and payment data. Does the SOE disclose key operational and payment data?
		6.3.2 SOE financial reporting and audits. Does the SOE subject itself to independent financial audits, and publish the results?
		6.3.3 SOE legislative oversight. Does the legislature oversee SOE performance without unduly constraining its decision making?
Revenue management (precepts 7 & 8)	7.1 Long-term fiscal sustainability. Is the government's spending and borrowing fiscally sustainable given that non-renewable natural resources are finite?	7.1.1 Sustainability metrics. Do sustainability indicators suggest that the government's use of resources and its spending policy is sustainable over the long term?
		7.1.2 Fiscal framework and fiscal rules. Does the government have a fiscal framework that promotes long-term fiscal sustainability and includes numerical targets?
		7.1.3 Compliance with fiscal framework and fiscal rules. Has the government adhered to its fiscal framework including any fiscal rules set? Are there verification and enforcement measures to promote compliance with any fiscal rules, and has the government complied with these targets?
		7.1.4 Debt policy. Does the government have a well-defined debt management policy, including provisions on the collateralization of government assets, borrowing terms, and transparency requirements?
		7.1.5 Expanding the tax base. Is the government helping to expand the non-resource tax base?
	7.2 Absorptive capacity. Does the government adequately manage the rate of spending in the domestic economy?	7.2.1 Absorptive capacity metrics. How effective is the government at transforming money into productive assets or social services?
		7.2.2 Absorptive capacity monitoring. Does the government have adequate information to assess whether the growth of total spending (including government spending) exceeds the limits of absorptive capacity?
		7.2.3 Managing domestic spending. Does the government use surplus revenues to repay foreign denominated debt or save in foreign assets to avoid breaching absorptive capacity constraints?
		7.2.4 Monetary policy. Does the central bank help mitigate the potential negative impacts associated with resource-dependence, including real exchange rate appreciation or exchange rate and revenue volatility?
	7.3 Expenditure volatility. Is government spending independent of short-term changes in revenues?	7.3.1 Volatility metrics. Has government spending been stable relative to government revenues during the past ten years?
		7.3.2 Expenditure smoothing. Does the government have a fiscal framework to govern short-term expenditure smoothing, with appropriate numerical targets, and does the government comply with the framework?
		7.3.3 Sovereign wealth fund. If the government has a sovereign wealth fund, is it managed in a transparent, accountable and efficient manner, and does the investment strategy help achieve the fund's objectives?

Public spending (precept 9)	<b>9.1 Public spending planning.</b> Does public spending align with national plans?	<b>9.1.1 Planning and budgeting.</b> Are national and sector plans formally integrated into the budgeting exercise?
		<b>9.1.2 Project design and appraisal.</b> Are public investment projects designed and appraised based on national and sector plans?
	<b>9.2 Revenue distribution.</b> Does the government distribute revenues in an accountable and transparent manner, and avoid off-budget transfers and spending?	<b>9.2.1 Resource revenues and the budget.</b> Is all government spending from resource revenues appropriated through the national budget?
		<b>9.2.2 Off-budget distribution.</b> If state-owned enterprises, savings funds or development banks receive revenues off-budget, is there sufficient justification for such arrangements, and are the revenues managed in a transparent, accountable and efficient manner?
		<b>9.2.3 Distribution to subnational authorities.</b> If the government allocates revenues to subnational governments, are the transfers based on a well-articulated set of objectives, and are the transfers correct and timely?
	<b>9.3 Budget and project execution.</b> Does the government spend public revenues as intended?	<b>9.3.1 Spending controls.</b> Are there spending controls and commitment plans in place, and do these result in public spending in line with the approved budget?
		<b>9.3.2 Project implementation.</b> Are public investment projects implemented as planned?
		<b>9.3.3 Public procurement.</b> Is public procurement predictable and subject to a process of open and competitive tendering?
	<b>9.4 Accounting, reporting and oversight of public spending.</b> Does the government account for and report on revenues and public spending, and is there strong oversight of public expenditure?	<b>9.4.1 Budget accounting and reporting.</b> Is public spending (including any off-budget spending of resource revenues) fully accounted for and reported?
		<b>9.4.2 Independent audit and oversight.</b> Is budget and off-budget recurrent spending subject to independent audit and oversight?
		<b>9.4.3 Public investment project accounting and reporting.</b> Are public investment projects fully accounted for and reported on?
		<b>9.4.4 Public investment project audit and evaluation.</b> Are there independent audits and evaluations of public investment projects?

Private sector development (precept 10)	10.1 Private sector enabling environment. Does the government make general purpose investment and remove bottlenecks to non-resource sector growth?	10.1.1 Industrial policy. Does the government engage with the private sector in a manner that ensures the best interest of the country as a whole, on grounds of economic rationale rather than patronage?
		10.1.2 Infrastructure. Does the government identify and address gaps between the country's existing physical infrastructure and the needs of the private sector?
		10.1.3 Construction sector. Does the government identify and address bottlenecks in the construction sector supply?
		10.1.4 Financial sector. Does the government identify and address bottlenecks in the financial system?
		10.1.5 Health and education. Does the government identify and address weaknesses in the country's health and education levels?
		10.1.6 Gender investment. Does the government identify and address weaknesses in how women are able to fully contribute to the economy?
		10.1.7 Business regulation. Does the government identify and address weaknesses in business regulations?
	10.2 Local content. Does the government ensure that domestic businesses and workers have the opportunity and capacity to operate in the extractive sector?	10.2.1 Supply side. Does the government remove barriers to local participation?
		10.2.2 Local content rules. If the government does employ local content rules, are they consistent with local capacity, do they avoid excessive protection, and guard against corruption?
		10.2.3 Local content implementation, monitoring and enforcement. Does the government monitor and enforce companies' adherence to local content rules, and the government's own support measures?
	10.3 Sharing infrastructure. Does the government ensure that extractive industry infrastructure is open to third parties wherever economically feasible?	10.3.1 Shared infrastructure coordination. Does the government help the coordination of extractive companies with other potential infrastructure users?
		10.3.2 Shared extractive industry-infrastructure regulation. Does the government assess the costs and benefits of facilitating shared use of infrastructure?
	10.4 Domestic value addition and consumption. Does the government take the opportunity to use oil, gas and mineral resources domestically, when the opportunity costs of doing so are less than the benefits?	10.4.1 Domestic value addition. If the government intends to intervene in domestic processing decisions, has it published an independent and robust assessment of the market failures, costs and benefits?
10.4.2 Domestic market obligation. If the government requires domestic marketing of the resource, has it published an independent and robust assessment of the market failures, costs and benefits?		
Role of extractive companies (precept 11)	11.1 Trust. Does the company work transparently and seek to build trust with all stakeholders related to its activities?	11.1.1 Meaningful participation. Does the company support the meaningful participation of affected communities in decision-making on projects?
		11.1.2 Managing expectations. Does the company ensure that stakeholder expectations are realistic?
		11.1.3 Comprehensive disclosure. Does the company proactively disclose key information?
		11.1.4 Security safeguards. Does the company ensure that security arrangements relating to resource projects do not use excessive force?
		11.1.5 Indigenous peoples. Does the company respect the rights of indigenous people?
	11.2 Sustainable development. Does the company work to maximize the potential benefits and minimize the social and environmental costs associated with resource extraction?	11.2.1 Cost mitigation. Does the company effectively mitigate the environmental, social and health impacts of resource projects?
		11.2.2 Understanding priorities and concerns. Does the company work to identify national and local development priorities and concerns, and measure its progress against them?
	11.3 Corporate integrity. Does the company act with honesty and integrity?	11.3.1 Corruption. Does the company have clear internal policies relating to corruption?
		11.3.2 Fiscal contribution. Does the company meet its fiscal obligations?
		11.3.3 Exemptions. Does the company avoid seeking exemptions from its legal and regulatory obligations?
		11.3.4 Company subcontractors. Does the company ensure that corporate integrity applies to partners, contractors and subcontractors?

Role of international community (precept 12)	12.1 Transparency. Does the international community advance public disclosure requirements for the extractive industry?	12.1.1 Home government transparency requirements. Do home governments require companies to disclose comprehensive information relating to resource projects?
		12.1.2 Lender transparency requirements. Do lenders require companies to disclose comprehensive information about the resource projects they finance?
	12.2 Environmental, social and health protection. Does the international community ensure that resource projects comply with internationally recognized standards of human rights, and environmental, social and health protection?	12.2.1 Home government human rights and environmental, social and health protection. Do home governments expect companies to respect human rights and the highest standards of environmental, social and health protection?
		12.2.2 Supporting host states on human rights and environmental, social and health protection. Do donors support host states to fulfil their duty to protect human rights and environmental, social and health standards, and ensure company compliance with human rights standards?
		12.2.3 Lender human rights and environmental, social and health protection. Do lenders require the companies they finance to respect human rights and the highest standards of environmental, social and health protection?
	12.3 Corruption and illicit financial flows. Does the international community tackle corruption and illicit financial flows?	12.3.1 Corruption. Do home governments maintain effective anti-corruption measures to reduce and prevent bribery and corruption?
12.3.2 Illicit financial flows. Do international organizations work to reduce illicit financial transactions?		

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